BYU Law Review
Volume 47

Issue 3

Article 9

Spring 5-1-2022

A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Taxation of Churches
Reece Barker

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Reece Barker, A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Taxation of Churches, 47 BYU L. Rev. 1001 (2022).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/lawreview/vol47/iss3/9

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Brigham Young University Law Review at BYU Law
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in BYU Law Review by an authorized editor of BYU Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

A Memorial and Remonstrance Against Taxation
of Churches
Reece Barker
C ONTENTS
I NTRODUCTION ............................................................................................1001
I. M EMORIAL AND R EMONSTRANCE A GAINST T AXATION OF CHURCHES ..........1004
A. The Church Is Not Within Cognizance of the State’s
Taxation Power .................................................................................... 1006
B. The Dangers of Taxing Religious Organizations ................................. 1008
C. Counterarguments .................................................................................. 1014
II. T HE HISTORICAL PRACTICE OF EXEMPTING C HURCHES FROM I NCOME AND
P ROPERTY T AXATION ........................................................................1015
A. Case Law History .................................................................................... 1015
1. Religious autonomy ........................................................................ 1016
2. Religious taxation ............................................................................ 1020
B. Statutory Law History ............................................................................. 1026
III. T HE J OHNSON AMENDMENT AND B OB J ONES PUBLIC POLICY STANDARD
U NDER THE C ONSTITUTIONAL R IGHT TO T AX EXEMPTION ...................1028
A. The Johnson Amendment ...................................................................... 1028
B. The Bob Jones Public Policy Standard .................................................... 1033
C ONCLUSION ...............................................................................................1036

INTRODUCTION
In 1784, the Virginia General Assembly considered a bill
directing tax money to the support of Christian ministers in the
state.1 In opposition to the proposed law, James Madison wrote his
famous Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments.2
 J. Reuben Clark Law School, J.D. Candidate 2022. Brigham Young University–
Idaho, B.S. 2019. Thanks to my wife Adrianna for her wisdom and support; Professors Brett
Scharffs and Robert Smith for their advice and suggestions; and Brock Mason for
brainstorming with me.
1. MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERTO A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A PLURALISTIC
SOCIETY 63 (1996).
2. Id. at 64.
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The Memorial received broad support from the people of Virginia
and the tax bill was never passed; instead, the Assembly enacted
the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty.3
The assertions in the Memorial form the heart of the First
Amendment’s Religion Clauses: its reasoning has been used to
analyze the constitutionality of many religious liberty issues
because its author drafted and advocated for the First Amendment.4
As discussed in this Note, Madison’s Memorial makes it clear
that taxation of religious organizations’5 non-commercial income
and property6 violates the Religion Clauses because it treads on the
church’s and the state’s autonomy.7 Case law, statutory law, and
historical practice all affirm this argument. Therefore, the Religion
Clauses mandate—not merely permit—income and property tax
exemption on religious organizations’ non-commercial income and
property.8 Under this mandate, not only are religious
organizations’ income and property exempt from taxation but the
3. Id. at 69.
4. Id. at 64 (“The Memorial and Remonstrance . . . has become one of the most
influential documents in the history of law and religion, and has been embraced as by the
Supreme Court as a key indicator of the meaning of the First Amendment.”); Comm. for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 760 (1973) (“[Memorial and Remonstrance’s]
strongly held convictions . . . are reflected in the first Clauses of the First Amendment of the
Bill of Rights, which state that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’”).
5. “Churches” is a generic term that includes all religious groups, not just Christians,
and is used interchangeably with “religious organizations.” This Note does not take a
specific stance on how broad the definition of “church” or “religious organization” should
be construed.
6. Throughout the paper, the phrases “taxation of religion,” “religious taxation,” and
“taxation of religious organizations’ non-commercial activities” are used interchangeably.
All these phrases refer to the same concept: taxation of religious organizations’ noncommercial income and property.
7. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012) (stating that the Religion Clauses restrict
“government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission
of the church itself”); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970) (“The hazards of churches
supporting government are hardly less in their potential than the hazards of government
supporting churches.”); see also Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU
L. REV. 1217, 1232 (2004) (“[T]he primary purpose underlying the Establishment Clause and
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is the preservation of autonomy—of the state,
of religious institutions, and of individuals.”).
8. The First Amendment’s restriction on the government’s religious taxation powers
does not extend to commercial activities. See infra Section II.A.2. See generally Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989). Furthermore, religious individuals are not exempt from
taxation. See infra Section II.A.2.
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curtailment on their internal doctrine under the Johnson
Amendment must be narrowed, and the removal of an exemption
for public policy reasons under Bob Jones University v. United States
must be limited to racial discrimination.
Although religious organizations are currently exempted from
taxation, this issue is important because there is a growing appetite
to remove the exemptions. For example, many view religion as an
untapped source of revenue for cash-strapped governments.9
Others think they can coerce religious organizations to bend to the
will of popular opinion through revocation of tax exemption.10 But
whether the tax is designed to increase revenue or to align doctrine
with popular opinion, religious taxation is off the table. It is off the
table because tax exemption for religious organizations is not a
reward, benefit, tax break, or legislative prerogative; it is a right
rooted in the First Amendment. A right that acts as a crucial
bulwark of society because it enables state and church autonomy
that protects each from exercising undue influence over the other.
Part I of this Note shows that tax exemption for religious
organizations is constitutionally mandated by looking at it through
Madison’s Memorial. Part II provides the case law, statutory law,
and historical practice supporting that assertion. Part III looks at
this constitutional right’s effect on the Johnson Amendment and the
Bob Jones public policy standard.

9. See Laura McCrystal, $29.6 Billion of Philly Real Estate Is Exempt from Property Taxes.
Should Nonprofits Be Asked To Pay Up?, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 30, 2019),
https://www.inquirer.com/news/philadelphia-nonprofit-exempt-property-tax-pilotspenn-aramark-20190930.html; Anya Zoledziowski, There Are Growing Calls to Finally Tax the
Catholic Church, VICE (July 7, 2021, 10:44 AM), https://www.vice.com/en/article/
m7ep4x/there-are-growing-calls-to-finally-tax-the-catholic-church; Stephanie Strom, States
Move to Revoke Charities’ Tax Exemptions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 27, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/us/28charity.html.
10. See Tim Hains, Beto O’Rourke: Churches That Oppose Same-Sex Marriage Should Lose
Tax-Exempt Status, REALCLEARPOLITICS (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/
video/2019/10/11/beto_orourke_churches_that_oppose_same-sex_marriage_should_
lose_tax-exempt_status.html (“There can be no reward, no benefit, no tax break for anyone
or any institution, any organization in America that denies the full human rights and the full
civil rights of every single one of us.”).
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I. MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST TAXATION OF
CHURCHES
James Madison’s Memorial was written in 1785 in response to a
Virginia religious assessment bill creating a property tax and
funneling that revenue to church leaders for the support of
ministers and houses of worship.11 Those who supported the bill—
including Patrick Henry, George Washington, and John Marshall—
viewed the contemporary decline in church attendance and
religiosity as dangerous to the fiber of society; this bill was a way
to stop the slide away from religiosity.12 While some of those motives
were perhaps noble, the opposition to the bill snuffed out the bill’s
underlying threat to society. Foremost amongst the opposition was
James Madison, then a member of the Continental Congress.
Madison’s opposition was recorded and distributed in the form
of the Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments. In
the Memorial, Madison penned fifteen reasons why the bill for
support of religion was “a dangerous abuse of power.”13 First listed
was that the worship of God must be left to the conscience of every
person and exempt from the grasp of civil society. Because the bill
presumed that the worship of God is within the grasp of civil
society, Madison saw many latent dangers in the bill. One latent
threat, according to Madison, was the power within the bill to
establish religion and coerce religious conformity.14
Continuing his Memorial, Madison attacked the state as an
incompetent judge of religious truth and called its use of religion as
an engine of civil policy a “perversion of the means of salvation.”15
Salvation was not assisted by the state, yet the bill implied that
religion, which is upheld by the Creator, needs support from the
powers of this world. In reality, whenever a church has been
supported by the state, it has led to “pride and indolence in the
Clergy, ignorance and servility in the laity, in both, superstition,

11. ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 1, at 63–64.
12. Id. at 63; Marvin K. Singleton, Colonial Virginia as First Amendment Matrix: Henry,
Madison, and Assessment Establishment, in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 157, 161–62
(Robert S. Alley ed., 1985).
13. JAMES MADISON, A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE (1785), reprinted in ARIENS &
DESTRO, supra note 1, at 64 [hereinafter MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE].
14. Id. at 65–66.
15. Id. at 66.
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bigotry and persecution.”16 And neither does the state need a
connection to the church in order to thrive. Establishments of
religion have, rather, resulted in spiritual tyranny and been an easy
conduit for tyrants to undermine public liberties.17 Better, Madison
says, is to protect every person in their worship by not invading
any religion and preventing religions from invading one another.
Yet this bill for the support of religion did just that and was,
therefore, contrary to the promise of the American continent, a
place where the religiously persecuted could flee and enjoy
liberty.18 Instead of promising repose, the bill’s interference with
religion added motivation to emigrate away from the American
continent, the same motivator that has depopulated other formerly
great nations.19
Wrapping up his Memorial, Madison mourned over the
destruction that the bill would cause to Virginia’s religious
harmony. The best antidote to religious conflict in society, said
Madison, is the “relaxation of narrow and rigorous policy,” as
opposed to inhibiting religious freedom.20 Yet this bill for the
support of religion would be so obnoxious to a great deal of citizens
it would work a general enervation of the laws and strain the
political system.21
Virginians received these arguments favorably. Because of the
widespread support, the bill was scrapped.22 To this day,
Madison’s Memorial stands as a definitive interpretation of
religious liberty: extolling church-state autonomy and liberal
policies toward conscience, but also warning against church-state
entanglement and invading conscience because of their likelihood
to lead to tyranny, societal disruption, emigration, and America’s
failure as a place of liberty.23

16. Id. at 67.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 68.
21. Id. at 67.
22. Id. at 64.
23. Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of the Twp. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 37 (1947) (Rutledge, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the Memorial is “Madison’s complete, though not his only,
interpretation of religious liberty”); Patrick McKinley Brennan, Free Exercise! Following
Conscience, Developing Doctrine, and Opening Politics, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 933, 945 (1999)
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Stepping away from the Memorial’s arguments against taxes to
support religion, its rationales also persuade against taxation of
religions’ non-commercial income and property. Indeed, taxation
of religious organizations poses grave dangers to society because it
would reduce the autonomy of the church and the state, trample on
conscience, increase disruptions and divisions in society, and
thereby tarnish America’s image as a land of religious liberty.
Taxation of churches to support the state is equally extreme and
egregious as what Madison fought in his day—state taxation to
support religion—and should be rejected.
Rejecting taxation of religion, like Madison’s rejection of the
religious assessment bill, is based on two things. First, that the
church is outside the cognizance of the state. And second, that
entanglement of the two poses great threats to each. This section
looks closer at those bases vis-à-vis taxation of religion.
A. The Church Is Not Within Cognizance of the State’s Taxation Power
To James Madison, “[r]eligion [is] not within the cognizance of
Civil Government” and even less so is it subject to society’s
legislative body.24 In addition, religious liberty is the equal right of
every citizen and a “gift of nature,” which the legislature must
leave “untouched and sacred.”25 It is a natural right,26 which is
retained from the government.27
The government has no right to interfere with this natural right,
religion being “perfectly free and unshackled” such that the
government has no jurisdiction over religion.28 This unshackling
preserves religious liberty and benefits society by protecting
“temporal institutions from religious interference” and “religious
liberty from the invasions of the civil authority.”29 By rescuing these

(calling the Memorial a “panegyric to the good of the free exercise and the evils of
establishment of religion”).
24. MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 13, at 67, 65.
25. Id. at 68–69.
26. Id. at 71.
27. Id. at 69.
28. Everson, 330 U.S. 1 at 38–39 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (quoting V WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON 132, 176 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904)).
29. Id. at 15 (majority opinion) (quoting Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 730 (1871)).
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institutions from each other, religion becomes personal and beyond
the scope of government to either hinder or support.30
These protections were enshrined in the First Amendment,
which gives “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation—in short,
power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters
of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”31 This
avoids mixing state and church in a manner that “jumbles heaven
and earth together, the things most remote and opposite,” two
spheres that are “in their original, end, business, and in everything
perfectly distinct and infinitely different from each other.”32
For an example of jumbling heaven and earth, look no further
than financial ties between church and state. In fact, numerous
early battles over religious liberty in America were fought over
church-state financial entanglement.33 By severing this financial tie,
churches gained control over their leaders, doctrines, and other
internal matters, and the state was free to ignore the church’s
demands to impart to their members political and government
privileges and penalize citizens who did not conform to their
doctrinal requirements.34 Madison’s Memorial went to the heart of
this issue,35 and the Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty denounces
these financial relationships because they defile religion by bribing
those who will conform to popular opinion.36 As a result, the
30. See id. at 39–40 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
31. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
32. John Locke, John Locke Letter Concerning Toleration 1689, FROM REVOLUTION TO
RECONSTRUCTION AND BEYOND, http://www.let.rug.nl/usa/documents/1651-1700/johnlocke-letter-concerning-toleration-1689.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2021).
33. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, Dissent and Disestablishment: The Church-State Settlement in
the Early American Republic, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1385, 1550 (2004) (“[T]he defeat of religious
assessments . . . [was] achieved in state after state.”); id. at 1435 (Isaac Backus opposing
religious assessments in New England); id. at 1509 (John Leland opposing religious
assessments in Connecticut); id. at 1489–90 (Protestant opposition defeating religious
assessments in Maryland); id. at 1497 (Georgia constitutional amendment eliminating
religious assessments).
34. Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C.
L. REV. 1071, 1098 (2002).
35. Robert S. Peck, The Threat to the American Idea of Religious Liberty, 46 MERCER L. REV.
1123, 1131–32 (1995) (“Madison drafted an argument that was widely and anonymously
circulated as a petition against the proposed general assessment bill.”).
36. THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, reprinted in
ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 1, at 70.
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autonomy of the church and the state in America was directly
related to economic independence.37
In sum, the state does not have cognizance over religious
organizations’ wealth and financial resources. Taxation
impermissibly gives the state such cognizance, thereby
intermingling church and state and subjecting each to the
invasions, interference, control, and manipulations of the other.
B. The Dangers of Taxing Religious Organizations
There are many dangers in giving the state cognizance over the
church, and Madison lays them out in his Memorial. First among
them is the state subjecting one religion to another and creating
establishments.38 Through this the government would eliminate the
equality of “those whose opinions in Religion do not bend to those
of the Legislative authority.”39 Such actions would harm numerous
citizens, weaken the laws in general, and “slacken the bands of
Society,”40 thereby destroying the moderation and harmony
produced by government refusing to intermeddle with religion.41
The ensuing disharmony and revocation of religious liberty would
be a motivation for emigration, the same result that has
“dishonoured and depopulated flourishing kingdoms.”42
These same dangers would present themselves if the state had
tax cognizance over religion. This section addresses these dangers
in turn.
First, taxation would eliminate necessary separation between
church and state. In fact, current tax exemptions were created to
avoid the latent dangers inherent in taxing churches,43 restrict the
church and state’s fiscal relationship, and “complement and
37. Erika King, Tax Exemptions and the Establishment Clause, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 971,
975 (1999).
38. See MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 13, at 67 (“[T]he same authority
which can establish Christianity, in exclusion of all other Religions, may establish with the
same ease any particular sect of Christians, in exclusion of all other Sects[.] That the same
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence only of his property for the
support of any one establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in
all cases whatsoever[.]”). Id. at 65–66.
39. Id. at 67.
40. Id. at 68.
41. Id. at 67.
42. Id.
43. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970).
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reinforce the desired separation insulating each from the other.”44
Indeed, taxation of religions would expand church-state
involvement through financial reporting, lobbying, audits into
operations and finances, valuation of church property, tax liens, tax
foreclosures, garnishment, and the confrontations and conflicts that
follow from legal processes,45 including the seizure and sale of
church property to satisfy delinquencies.46
Moreover, payment of taxes would transfer money donated for
religious purposes to secular purposes, thus giving to Caesar what
belongs to God, even though donors already render to Caesar
through their personal taxes.47 This hampers a church’s ability to
finance its missionary work, educational institutions, health care,
care for the poor, and saving for future financial downturns,
possibly confining churches to narrow activities that fall only
within the realm of worship services.48 This would ultimately
curtail churches’ missions and make their missions subservient to
the aims of the state, a hierarchy that was dismissed with the
Religion Clauses’ ratification.
Another danger of taxation is its power to destroy religion. “An
unlimited power to tax involves, necessarily, a power to destroy;
because there is a limit beyond which no institution and no
property can bear taxation.”49 This power to destroy is “a reason
why the right to tax should be confined to subjects which may be
lawfully embraced therein.”50 This power is a weapon that “in the
hands of unscrupulous or bigoted men, could be used to suppress
freedoms and destroy religion unless it is kept within appropriate
bounds.”51 Just as religious freedom is harmed when the
44. Id. at 676.
45. Id. at 674.
46. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 44 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47. “Render therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar’s; and unto God the
things that are God’s.” Matthew 22:21 (King James).
48. Walz, 397 U.S. at 692 (Brennan, J., concurring). Higher-education leaders expressed
similar worries when they wrote to Congress in objection to the endowment tax. HIGHER
EDUCATION LETTER TO CONGRESS (Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/sites/
default/server_files/media/3-7-18%20Universities%20letter%20re%20endowment%20tax.pdf.
49. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 327 (1819). Later it was said that the power to
tax “is not the power to destroy while this Court sits,” but the taxation power remains a
threat to inhibit religious liberty. Panhandle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218,
223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
50. McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 59–60 (1904); see supra Section I.A.
51. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 579 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring).
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government uses its taxing power to aid one religion over
another,52 religious liberty is harmed when the government
employs its taxing powers to inhibit religion. Thus, the First
Amendment “operates as a specific constitutional limitation upon
the exercise by Congress of the taxing [power].”53
History is not devoid of examples of taxation’s destruction of
religion. One prominent example is the Dissolution of the
Monasteries in sixteenth-century England.54 After King Henry VIII
was declared the Church of England’s supreme head, he set to work
in exercising his authority over religion.55 He saw in Catholic
monasteries both a source of dissent and a source of wealth for his
war-consumed reign.56 After assessing the value of the monastic
properties and conducting a publicity campaign to set the
monasteries in a bad light, he commenced a regime that, in under
five years, led to the wholescale confiscation of monastic property
and wealth to the benefit of the Crown.57
As demonstrated during the Dissolution of the Monasteries,
government control over church resources increases the financial
pressure for churches to abandon their free-exercise rights.
Society’s wrath can quickly be turned against unfavorable
religions—or all religions—if federal, state, or local governments
could wield the tax power against churches.
Several
recent
examples
also
illustrate
this.
A
presidential candidate introduced a platform that would strip
religious organizations of their exemption because they oppose

52. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1968) (holding that using taxpayer money to
fund religious schools violated the First Amendment).
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., King, supra note 37, at 975 (“[M]uch has been written about Henry VIII’s
decision to confiscate the vast wealth of the Church once he severed ties with Rome in the
sixteenth century. A century later Oliver Cromwell, too, would levy stiff taxes on church
property. These and other examples demonstrate the very real threat to a church’s existence
when the ability to tax is wielded by a sovereign bent on destruction (or at least
subordination) of the institution.”).
55. See LUCY WOODING, HENRY VIII 216–30 (2d ed. 2015).
56. Id.; Ben Johnson, Dissolution of the Monasteries, HISTORIC UK (last visited Oct. 19,
2021), https://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofEngland/Dissolution-of-theMonasteries; Mark Cartwright, Dissolution of the Monasteries, WORLD HIST. ENCYCLOPEDIA
(May 13, 2020), https://www.worldhistory.org/Dissolution_of_the_Monasteries/.
57. See Dissolution of the Monasteries, in THE CONCISE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF THE
CHRISTIAN CHURCH (E.A. Livingstone ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2d rev. ed. 2006); Cartwright,
supra note 56.
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same-sex marriage.58 And one legal scholar called for taxation of
religious organizations that do not allow women to have leadership
positions because “keeping women out of leadership positions
denies women the opportunity to participate in society as equals.”59
Another legal scholar urges total denial of exempt status to
religious organizations because “[c]hurches remain free to refuse to
hire women and minorities as ministers or to deny membership to
any group they wish to exclude.”60 If taxation of religious
organizations were permitted, then these individuals could use the
tax code to financially coerce religious organizations to change their
doctrines and internal governance.
In this way, taxation of churches would have many of the same
pitfalls as Congress’s recent decision to tax the endowments of
previously exempt higher-education institutions. As part of the Tax
Cuts and Jobs Act, a 1.4% net investment income tax was imposed
on education institutions that have investment assets with an
aggregate fair value of $500,000 per student,61 effectively taxing
only Harvard, Yale, Stanford, and around forty-three other wealthy
universities.62 This tax was passed because many in Congress
disagree with how large universities use their endowments, and
likely because the institutions are viewed by conservative
legislators as producing and advocating liberal viewpoints.63
58. Hains, supra note 10.
59. Mary E. Becker, The Politics of Women’s Wrongs and the Bill of “Rights”: A Bicentennial
Perspective, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 453, 485 (1992).
60. Judith C. Miles, Beyond Bob Jones: Toward the Elimination of Governmental Subsidy of
Discrimination by Religious Institutions, 8 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 31, 33–34 (1985).
61. I.R.C. § 4968.
62. Rick Seltzer, How Much Are Most Colleges Paying in Endowment Tax?, INSIDE HIGHER
ED (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/02/18/wealthiestuniversities-are-paying-big-endowment-tax-bills-how-much-are-others-who (“NACUBO
data show 46 institutions with per-student endowment assets of more than $500,000 on a
full-time equivalent basis.”).
63. Jamie D. Halper, Harvard To Pay ‘Unprecedented’ Endowment Tax, HARV. CRIMSON
(Dec. 20, 2017), https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2017/12/20/endowment-taxpassed/ (“I think there are more people in the Republican party than in the Democratic party
who believe that higher education is failing the public—that it’s full of liberals teaching
things that are irrelevant to getting a job.”); John K. Wilson, Why the Endowment Tax Is
Unconstitutional, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.insidehighered.com/
views/2018/01/16/tax-college-endowment-unconstitutionally-targets-institutions-opinion
(“[I]t’s clear that the point of the endowment tax is not to tax wealthy universities. It’s to send
a warning shot at all colleges and universities to restrain academic freedom or risk further
economic assaults on higher education.”).
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If churches were taxable, it is easy to imagine Congress unleashing
a similar tax against religious organizations because Congress may
disagree with how their funds are used or with their religious
viewpoints. Lobbying could also come into play as taxed churches
will no doubt seek representation, leaving the possibility for
religious favoritism in new tax bills. This happened in the netinvestment income tax where members in Congress worked to
carve out a tax exemption for Hillsdale College—long seen as a
conservative bastion in higher education.64 Through lobbying,
loopholes, and influence, taxation of churches could quickly
become a throwback to America’s colonial establishments, where
only the established—or politically well-connected—church was
exempt and other churches were taxed.65
The harm of taxing churches does not end there. Income and
property taxation of churches would also disadvantage poor
religions, further creating religious inequality and inhibiting
religion. Taxation would have its “most disruptive effect on those
with the least ability to meet the annual levies assessed against
them.”66 Less wealthy churches could find it hard to carry out their
mission or expand in new areas, whereas wealthier churches would
not have the same problem. By increasing the cost of operations,
taxation would reduce religious plurality.67 In addition, tax
legislation and IRS regulations could be increasingly manipulated
to disfavor outsider religions—such as the IRS’s decision, since

64. Wilson, supra note 63; Adam Harris, The Brief Life and Undignified Death of the
‘Hillsdale Carve-Out’, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/
article/the-brief-life-and-undignified-death-of-the-hillsdale-carve-out/.
65. John W. Whitehead, Tax Exemption and Churches: A Historical and Constitutional
Analysis, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 521, 536 (1992) (“Colonial tax exemptions from assessments for
support of state-established churches, if allowed, were apparently provided only for stateestablished churches, and dissenting religions were taxed.”).
66. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 692 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
67. This was particularly important to Madison, who was a proponent of plurality to
decrease the power of factions. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E.
Cooke ed., 1961). He viewed lack of plurality as a threat to liberty because if one faction
obtained too much power it would exercise tyranny over other factions. To Madison,
plurality was a key constraint on factions because through the multiplicity of parties and
interests it would be difficult to form dominant factions. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra, at
351–53 (James Madison).
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reversed, to deny the Church of Scientology charitable contribution
deductions that are given to other churches.68
The culmination of all these factors leads to divisions,
disruptions, and enervation of the laws, destroying the harmony
and moderation between religions that exists because of tax
exemption. Federal, state, and local government taxation of
churches could become a political tool used for or against religious
groups. All this would work to stir up religions and citizens against
each other in attempts to use religion as an engine of civil policy.69
As groups felt targeted and became victims of this politization
of rights, their leaders and members would begin to protest.
They would begin to distrust the laws because they are a tool for
their subjugation.
What is the result of all of this? America’s claim as a place of
liberty would be tainted and the persecuted would be motivated to
emigrate and find other locations where they can enjoy liberty and
harmony, and where they can use their income and property to
promote their religious missions.
These dangers demonstrate how religious taxation
disintegrates state and church autonomy, allowing each to exercise
undue influence over the other. This undue influence violates
autonomy principles at the core of the Religion Clauses. As
Madison said, “relaxation of narrow and rigorous policy, wherever
it has been tried, has been found to assuage the disease” of religious
discord.70 Exemption does exactly that.

68. Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 704 (1989) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“The
Court today acquiesces in the decision of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) to manufacture
a singular exception to its 70-year practice of allowing fixed payments indistinguishable from
those made by petitioners to be deducted as charitable contributions. Because the IRS cannot
constitutionally be allowed to select which religions will receive the benefit of its past rulings,
I respectfully dissent.”). This has since been rectified but the example shows how the taxing
power can be wielded against unpopular and new religions.
69. MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 13, at 66 (“[T]he Bill implies . . . that
the Civil Magistrate . . . may employ Religion as an engine of Civil policy . . . . [This is] an
unhallowed perversion of the means of salvation.”).
70. Id. at 68. Reducing government restrictions on religion reduces social strife related
to religion. Brian J. Grim & Vegard Skirbekk, Religious Deregulation: A Key to Understanding
Whether Religious Plurality Leads to Strife, POPULATION ASS’N AM. 1 (2011).
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C. Counterarguments
The counterarguments against these points are meritless. For
instance, it could be argued that using the Memorial to reject church
taxation is inapt because it was written to oppose state support of
churches, an entirely different purpose. There are two points
against that argument. First, just like state financial support of
churches, church financial support of the state is detrimental to
religion and civil society.71 As shown in this section, church support
of the state runs into the same problems that Madison warned
about when he decried state support of churches: intermingling,
establishment, discrimination, disharmony, and treading on
natural rights. Second, rejection of one extreme—state support of
churches though taxation—is grounds to reject the opposite
extreme—church support of the state through taxation.
A further complaint is that Madison himself wrote the Detached
Memoranda, a note about the danger of churches and corporations
accumulating wealth.72 In the note, Madison worried about the
dangerous precedent of “indefinite accumulation of property from
the capacity of holding it in perpetuity by ecclesiastical
corporations.”73 He points to the abuses of European churches who
had amassed half of the property in their nations, and he considers
putting a limit on the amount of time and value of religious
corporations’ property.74
Nonetheless, the Memoranda does not justify state taxation of
churches. First, the Memoranda does not advocate taxation of
churches; it merely muses about the problems of churches and
corporations owning too much property in perpetuity. Second,
Madison himself was a member of the Virginia General Assembly
that exempted churches from property taxes.75 Third, the
Memoranda lacks relevance and authority. The private note was
released to the public a century after it was written and contains
Madison’s thoughts thirty-plus years after writing his Memorial and
71. Walz, 397 U.S. at 675 (“The hazards of churches supporting government are hardly
less in their potential than the hazards of government supporting churches . . . .”).
72. JAMES MADISON, DETACHED MEMORANDA, reprinted in JAMES MADISON ON
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 89 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) [hereinafter DETACHED MEMORANDA]. The
note was not discovered until 1946. Id.
73. Id. at 91.
74. Id.
75. Walz, 397 U.S. at 684 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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decades after passage of the Virginia exemption and the First
Amendment.76 It also expresses unpopular views for the time
period. For instance, his note argues against practices that began
with the Founders and continue to this time, such as the
appointment of chaplains for the two houses of Congress, Army,
and Navy, and religious proclamations by executives.77 Taxation of
churches was also an unpopular view at the founding.78 In sum, this
private note’s post hoc, narrowly accepted interpretation of
religious liberty does not diminish the relevant, authoritative, and
widely accepted view of religious liberty in the Memorial.79
II. THE HISTORICAL PRACTICE OF EXEMPTING CHURCHES FROM
INCOME AND PROPERTY TAXATION
A. Case Law History
The United States Supreme Court has annunciated the state’s
lack of religious taxation power and the dangers to society if the
state possessed that power. Although the Court has never
definitively held that there is a constitutional right to income and
property tax exemption for religious organizations, the Court’s case
law supports the assertion.
What follows is a review of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
on the question, examining first religious-autonomy cases, then
examining taxation-of-religion specific cases. Both sets of cases—by
analogy to taxation—support Madison’s views that the church is
outside the state’s cognizance and that entanglement of church and
state poses great threats to each.

76. Id. at 684 n.5.
77. DETACHED MEMORANDA, supra note 72, at 91–94.
78. See Carl Zollmann, Tax Exemptions of American Church Property, 14 MICH. L. REV.
646, 648 (1916) (“The practice exempting [church property] was universally considered to be
proper . . . .”).
79. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 575–76 (2014) (noting that Madison’s
Detached Memorandum was in opposition to the Court’s holding that legislative prayer did
not violate the Establishment Clause yet legislative prayer had broad support at the
founding); see also Walz, 397 U.S. at 685 (Brennan, J., concurring) (“It is unlikely that two men
[Jefferson and Madison] so concerned with the separation of church and state would have
remained silent had they thought . . . exemptions established religion.”).
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1. Religious autonomy
In its religious-autonomy cases, the Court has hearkened to the
Memorial’s principles: the state lacks certain authorities over the
church, and such authority, if possessed, creates dangers to churchstate autonomy. While religious organizations’ constitutional right
to tax exemption has never been directly addressed by the Court,
the Court’s decisions addressing church property and employment
touch upon the issue indirectly and confirm that church noncommercial income and property taxation are impermissible.80
Because the state has no authority over churches’ internal
governance—thus far the Court has addressed property and
employment decisions—the state has no authority over church
resources (i.e., income and property).
The Court first addressed these issues in Watson v. Jones,81
where it refused to question a church-governing-body’s property
allocation decision between two congregational factions. The Court
held that legal tribunals must accept as binding church judicatories’
decisions on “questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical
rule, custom, or law.”82 Structured this way, the First Amendment
protects autonomy of the state and of the church. According to
the Court, “[t]he structure of our government has, for the
preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal institutions
from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured
religious liberty from the invasion of civil authority.”83 The Watson
decision “radiate[d] . . . a spirit of freedom for religious
organizations, an independence from secular control or
manipulation—in short, power to decide for themselves, free from
state interference, matters of church government as well as those of
faith and doctrine.”84

80. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp.
Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 185 (2012) (“This Court touched upon the issue
indirectly, however, in the context of disputes over church property. Our decisions in that
area confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a church’s
determination of who can act as its ministers.”).
81. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
82. Id. at 727.
83. Id. at 730.
84. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
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The Court reiterated religious organizations’ independence
from secular control in later cases. In Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas
Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, the Court
held that a New York law interfered with strictly ecclesiastical
matters when it selected a U.S. faction to control a domestic
cathedral instead of the foreign faction anointed by the religious
organization’s highest governing body.85 A similar holding came in
a later case, when the Court rejected an Illinois court’s inquiry into
whether a church followed its own laws and procedures in
deciding a property dispute.86
The Court’s refusal to interfere with religious organizations’
autonomy under the Religion Clauses was extended beyond
property disputes to employment disputes in Hosanna-Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission.87 In that case, the Court held that requiring
a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister—whether or not
the termination decision violated the Americans with Disabilities
Act—interfered with the internal governance of the church.88
Interfering with the church’s decision, the Court stated, violates
both Religion Clauses. The Free Exercise Clause, because it
interfered with a church’s “right to shape its own faith and
mission,” and the Establishment Clause, because it “prohibits
government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions.”89
That the state does not have authority over the church’s internal
governance forms the heart of the Religion Clauses and Madison’s
Memorial. In that essay, Madison delineated the church as separate
and distinct from the commonwealth. Religion is “not within the
cognizance of Civil Government,” he wrote.90 Just as this principle
stops interference with religious organizations’ internal
governance in property and employment decisions, the principle
also stops interference with religious organizations’ resources
through income and property taxation. Protection from income and
property taxation ensures religious organizations’ power to shape
85. Id.
86. Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
87. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 185 (2012).
88. Id. at 188–89.
89. Id. at 173.
90. MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, supra note 13, at 67.
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their own faith and mission and prohibits the government’s
involvement in church financial decisions.
While the Court’s religious autonomy cases established the
state’s lack of authority over internal church governance, the cases
have, like the Memorial, also warned of the dangers to civil and
religious liberty if such authority was possessed. In particular,
Hosanna-Tabor harkened back to the English crown, which had
authority over the church in England. At that time, the King
exercised control over the church’s internal governance matters by
appointing ministers over the objections of clergy.91 This practice
deprived state-church autonomy and motivated Puritans, Quakers,
and others to flee England in search of a place to follow their
conscience.92 The Watson decision also warily looked back to
England where the English Court of Chancery was essentially a
representative of the established church. That court used its
authority to engage in theological and internal governance
disputes, one of England’s numerous “oppressive forms” of
dealing with religious beliefs.93
These grave threats to civil and religious liberties from
interference with religious autonomy were a focus of Madison’s
Memorial. In the essay he warns about subjugation of religions,
disharmony, and motivation for emigration resulting from
interfering with religion.94 These threats to autonomy are just as
real with taxation as with other religious autonomy issues. Under
a religious income and property tax regime, the separation of
church and state is weakened, religious organizations’ means and
missions become subservient to the state, religious rights are at the
mercy of political debate, poor religions are disadvantaged, and
disruption and divisions in society increase, with the end result of
emigration. England can be looked back to again for a harrowing
church-taxation example: before this nation’s founding the English
Crown used its taxation authority and apparatus to confiscate
Catholic monastic wealth across England.95
An objection to this autonomy argument is that the Free
Exercise Clause permits a government to pass generally and
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
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Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 182.
Id.
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727–28 (1871).
ARIENS & DESTRO, supra note 1, at 65–69.
See supra Section I.B.
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neutrally applicable tax laws and requires religious organizations
to submit to such laws.96 But the standard under the Free Exercise
Clause of generally and neutrally applicable laws declared in
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v.
Smith97 applies only to government regulation of outward physical
acts.98 Taxation, in contrast, involves government interference
with internal church decisions and resources that affect the faith
and mission of the church itself.99 The contention that generally
applicable tax laws foreclose the right of tax exemption rooted in
the Religion Clauses has no merit.100
And even if the rule of generally and neutrally applicable laws
did apply, it offers little protection for religion. This is because a tax
that discriminates against certain religions can be made to appear
generally and neutrally applicable.101 And a religious tax, even if it
is generally and neutrally applicable,102 cannot avoid diminishing
church-state autonomy and its resultant degradation of civil and
96. Dominic Rota, And on the Seventh Day, God Codified the Religious Tax-Exemption:
Reshaping the Modern Code Framework to Achieve Statutory Harmony with Other Charitable
Organizations and Prevent Abuse, 5 CONCORDIA L. REV. 56, 70 (2020) (“[S]o long as a
generally applicable tax does not burden the individual’s practice of his or her religion, the
government could theoretically levy a tax on the church, as there is no violation of the Free
Exercise Clause.”).
97. Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
98. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity
Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 190 (2012) (“Smith involved government regulation of only outward
physical acts.”).
99. Cf. id. (“The present case . . . concerns government interference with an internal
church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church itself.”).
100. Cf. id. (“The contention that Smith forecloses recognition of a ministerial exception
rooted in the Religion Clauses has no merit.”).
101. Jefferey M. Shaman, Rules of General Applicability, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 419, 463–
64 (2012) (“[A]lthough a law appears innocent on its face, it may have harmful effects in
the real world that raise serious constitutional concerns. Rules of general applicability,
clothed in neutrality, may appear to be innocent, but appearances, after all, can be
deceiving.”); Christopher C. Lund, A Matter of Constitutional Luck: The General Applicability
Requirement in Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 627, 629, 644–52 (2003)
(“[T]he protection [general applicability] provides is sporadic, idiosyncratic, unprincipled,
and unpredictable.”).
102. For instance, if the tax also applied to all I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) organizations (i.e.,
qualifying charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
organizations) or all 501(c)(3)s with a certain amount of wealth. Any religious tax that
provides a single exemption yet no exemption for religious purposes is unlikely to be
generally and neutrally applicable. See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1878
(2021) (“[T]he inclusion of a formal system of entirely discretionary exceptions . . . renders
the contractual nondiscrimination requirement not generally applicable.”).
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religious rights. Trusting these delicate rights to generally and
neutrally applicable laws is akin to stating that church and state
autonomy is protected sufficiently by the Free Exercise Clause
alone. It is not.103
To summarize, the Court’s religious-autonomy reasoning
extends to taxation. Because the state has no authority over
churches’ internal governance, it has no authority over church
income and property. And if the state had such authority, it would
be dangerous to both religious and civil liberties.
2. Religious taxation
The Supreme Court’s religious taxation jurisprudence has
annunciated these same principles in cases addressing religious
organizations’ exemption from license taxes and property taxes.
The Court has, however, spelled out the taxability of religious item
sales, nonreligious property, and religious individuals’ income.
In 1943, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment is a
limitation on the government’s taxing authority. In Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, the Court held that a flat tax required to obtain a
license for canvassing and soliciting violated the First Amendment
when it was applied to itinerant preachers who donated and sold
religious materials in the course of their door–to–door preaching.104
In that case, the town of Jeannette, Pennsylvania required all
persons soliciting sales to purchase a license.105 Under this law,
several itinerant Jehovah’s Witness preachers were convicted
for door–to–door solicitation of religious materials without a
license.106 The Court struck down the city’s licensing requirement
because it was “a flat license tax levied and collected as a condition
to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the
First Amendment.”107 The Court could not sanction a law that
required a payment to exercise this constitutionally guaranteed
right.108 Nor could the court allow an ordinance that had the

103. Cf. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 181 (“Both Religion Clauses bar the government
from interfering with [internal church governance].”).
104. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 106–07 (1943).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 114.
108. Id. at 115.
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potential to suppress religious minorities and crush the spreading
of religious beliefs.109
A year later, the Court addressed the same type of license tax in
Murdock, but with a slight twist in facts. In Follett v. Town of
McCormick, the defendant was not an itinerant preacher, but
minister living in town and making his living selling religious
materials.110 The Court readily extended the Murdock holding to the
preacher. And, in concurrence, Justice Murphy argued that the
Court’s striking down of the tax “give[s] substance” to religious
freedom.111 After all, he wrote, “the taxing and licensing power is a
dangerous and potent weapon which, in the hands of unscrupulous
or bigoted men, could be used to suppress freedoms and destroy
religion unless it is kept within appropriate bounds.”112
While Murdock and Follett stand for the proposition that no tax
can be leveled as a precondition to religious exercise, their
reasoning extends to non-license taxes such as property and income
taxes. This is because there is little difference between a tax leveled
to obtain a license to operate a religion and a tax on actual religious
operations. While one tax would be leveled before the religious
operations and the other leveled after, the taxes have the same
effect: taxation on religious operations with civil and criminal
penalties for evasion of those taxes.
Three decades after Murdock and Follett, the Court addressed a
New York citizen’s complaint that property tax exemption for
religious organizations violated the Constitution. In Walz v. Tax
Commission of the City of New York, the Court rejected the challenge
and held that the exemption was permitted.113 Because the plaintiff
was not a religious organization being taxed, but rather an
individual citizen suing the state tax commission, the Court only

109. Id. (“[I]f the formula of this type of ordinance is approved, a new device for the
suppression of religious minorities will have been found. This method of disseminating
religious beliefs can be crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which
is exacted town by town, village by village.”); see also Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 623–24
(1942) (Black, J., dissenting) (“[This ordinance] suppresses or tends to suppress the free
exercise of a religion practiced by a minority group. This is but another step in the direction
which Minersville School District v. Gobitis took against the same religious minority, and is a
logical extension of the principles upon which that decision rested.” (citation omitted)).
110. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576 (1944).
111. Id. at 579 (Murphy, J., concurring).
112. Id.
113. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 679–80 (1970).
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had to address whether the exemption was permitted by the
Constitution. But this does not rule out a future holding that tax
exemption of religious organizations is mandated.
Indeed, Walz advanced several ideas in support of mandating
tax exemption for religious organizations. Most importantly, the
Walz Court recognized that exemption reflects a belief—one in
place since the founding of the country—that taxation presents
danger to church and state autonomy: “The hazards of churches
supporting government are hardly less in their potential than the
hazards of government supporting churches . . . .”114
Picking up on this same concept, Justice Brennan, in
concurrence, argued that taxation would “involve extensive state
investigation into church operations and finances.”115 He further
points out that taxation would have its greatest negative effect on
poorer churches who have less ability to pay taxes. Even so, he
wrote, diverting church funds to the government would limit all
churches’ involvement in social-benefit programs.116 Providing
another perspective, Justice Harlan’s concurrence noted that tax
exemption protects against the “kind and degree of government
involvement in religious life that, as history teaches us, is apt to lead
to strife and frequently strain a political system to the breaking
point.”117 Preventing fragmentation and strife in society is a key
policy behind the Religion Clauses.118
Despite holdings that license taxes on religious exercise violate
the First Amendment and property-tax exemptions do not offend
the First Amendment, recent decisions have held that religious
organizations are not exempt from sales taxes.119 In Texas Monthly,
Inc. v. Bullock, a Texas magazine publishing religious and nonreligious media challenged a state sales-tax that exempted religious
periodicals and books distributed by religious faiths but denied a
like exemption for its magazine.120 The Court’s majority agreed that
114. Id. at 675 (“We cannot ignore the instances in history when church support of
government led to the kind of involvement we seek to avoid.”). Id.
115. Id. at 691 (Brennan, J., concurring).
116. Id. at 692.
117. Id. at 694 (Harlan, J., concurring).
118. See id.
119. A flat license tax that acts as a precondition to the free exercise of religious beliefs
is different from a tax that applies to all sales of tangible personal property. Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 387 (1990).
120. Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1989).
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this exemption violated the Constitution, but they could not come
to a uniform opinion as to why. A year later in Jimmy Swaggart
Ministries v. Board of Equalization of California, the Court doubled
down on subjecting religious organizations to sales taxes. Thus,
the state of California was permitted to levy sales tax on over
$1,700,000 in sales of Bibles, Bible study manuals, printed sermons,
audiocassette tapes of sermons, religious books and pamphlets,
and songbooks, tapes, and records of religious music.121
Justice Brennan’s Texas Monthly plurality opinion, which was
joined by three other justices, was expansive in its holding: it
dismissed precedent from Murdock v. Pennsylvania122 and
Follett v. Town of McCormick123 and declared that exemption is an
unconstitutional direct subsidy to religion.124 While none of the
Justices’ rationales are binding in this plurality opinion,125 together
they explain why the exemption on religious organizations’ sales
violated the Establishment Clause: the exemption favors religious
over non-religious entities when both are engaged in the same
commercial activity.126
This rationale is important in understanding the limits of
religious organizations’ tax exemption. When religious
organizations engage in commerce,127 they leave behind their
Religious Clause taxation protections and enter the state’s taxation
cognizance. Having entered the state’s taxing cognizance, the
religious organization’s commercial activity must be subject to
similar taxation standards as other commercial entities128 or it
121. Jimmy Swaggart, 493 U.S. at 383.
122. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding that a tax for a license to
preach is unconstitutional).
123. Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (holding that a tax for a license
to preach is unconstitutional).
124. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 16, 18.
125. Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420, 433 (7th Cir. 2019).
126. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 17 (A sales tax exemption for periodicals promulgating
the teaching of religious sects “lacks a secular objective that would justify this preference
along with similar benefits for nonreligious publications or groups, and . . . it effectively
endorses religious belief”).
127. In addition to religious operations, religious organizations’ charitable and
educational operations are not commercial activities. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (exempting from
taxation “[c]orporations . . . organized and operated exclusively for . . . charitable . . . or
educational purposes”).
128. That is the current practice in federal tax law. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (Unrelated business
taxable income); 26 C.F.R. § 1.513-1(b) (2020) (“The primary objective of adoption of the
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offends the Establishment Clause by favoring religious
organizations. In other words, unlike religious organizations
receiving donations, using those donations for their mission,
owning property for religious purposes, and investing those
donations to save for their future religious mission, religious
organizations’ commercial activities are within the state’s taxing
cognizance. Therefore, when the state exempts a religious
organization’s commercial activity and the benefits from that
commercial activity inure to the religious organization, the state
subsidizes religion.
It is for this reason that the Texas Monthly and Jimmy Swaggart
holdings are limited to commercial activity. Indeed, these cases
address only religious organizations’ commercial activities.
Another case dealing with commercial activity of religious
organizations is Gibbons v. District of Columbia.129 In that 1886 case,
the Supreme Court addressed the District of Columbia’s taxdeficiency sale of land owned by a church but leased for
nonreligious purposes. The Court permitted the sale because the
statute exempting churches did not exempt land unnecessary for or
not used for religious purposes.130
Like the sales tax cases—Texas Monthly and Jimmy Swaggart—
Gibbons shows a religious organization’s commercial activities are
not protected from taxation. Yet Gibbons does not approve property
taxation on land used for religious purposes, since it addressed
land owned by a church but not used for religious purposes. Nor
did it address how the Religion Clauses limit Congress’s taxing
power.131 Those issues are addressed by religious-autonomy cases,
Walz, Follett, and Murdock.

unrelated business income tax was to eliminate a source of unfair competition by placing the
unrelated business activities of certain exempt organizations upon the same tax basis as the
nonexempt business endeavors with which they compete.”); Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT:
Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting a Level One?, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 857, 864 (2007)
(“The UBIT, thus, levels what would otherwise be an unlevel playing field. It works by
placing both for-profit and nonprofit entities on similar tax terms when they engage in
commercial activities.”); id. (“The legislative history of the UBIT contains numerous
statements that the purpose behind the tax is to protect for-profit businesses from unfair
competition from tax-exempt businesses.”).
129. Gibbons v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S. 404 (1886).
130. Id. at 406–07.
131. Id. at 408.
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Another aspect of tax exemption clarified by case law is that
religious individuals are not exempt from taxation. In United States
v. Lee, the Court held that there can be no religious conscientious
objection to social security taxes when it required an Amish
business owner to pay social security tax for his employees against
his religious objection.132 The government’s crucial interest in
maintaining a tax system was a compelling reason to disregard
First Amendment-grounded objections to social security taxes.133
But this case does not rule out using the First Amendment as a
constraint on an income or property tax levied on religious
organizations. There is a difference between a tax on a religious
person and a tax on a religious organization. Exempting private
individuals from taxation would make it nearly impossible to raise
revenue and maintain a tax system, but religious organizations
already exist outside the tax system, so there is no argument that
the tax system would fail without their participation. In addition,
churches as organizations have autonomy protections that
ordinary citizens do not have.134
The Supreme Court has not addressed head-on whether
property or income taxation of religious organizations violates the
First Amendment. But case law supports the proposition, especially
the holdings and rationales in religious-autonomy cases, Walz,
Follett, and Murdock that point to the state’s lack of church taxation
authority and the dangers if the state possessed that authority.

132. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 252 (1982).
133. Id. at 258–59.
134. See supra Part I. Additionally, in a letter to the town of Providence, Roger Williams,
a foremost religious freedom advocate in the American Colonies, described the duties of
religious persons to pay taxes by analogizing the state to a transport boat:
If any of the seamen refuse to perform their services, or passengers to pay their
freight; if any refuse to help, in person or purse, towards the common charges or
defence; if any refuse to obey the common laws and orders of the ship, concerning
their common peace or preservation . . . I say, I never denied, but in such cases,
whatever is pretended, the commander or commanders may judge, resist, compel,
and punish such transgressors, according to their deserts and merits.
Roger Williams to the Town of Providence, U. CHI. PRESS, https://presspubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/amendI_religions6.html (last visited Jan. 14,
2022) (emphasis added).
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B. Statutory Law History
These rationales against taxation of religious organizations are
borne out of historical practice. Looking at our nation’s taxexemption history demonstrates that tax exemption serves to avoid
the struggle for supremacy between the church and the state,135
which is further support for the constitutional right to tax
exemption for religious organizations.
Concerns over the church-state financial relationship were a
core issue for early Americans who wanted to avoid the struggle
for supremacy between the church and the state.136 These
Americans viewed independence of both church and state as a way
to keep the church from being subordinate to the state and the state
from being subordinate to the church.137 Indeed, when early
Americans were creating independence between church and state,
they left in place or enacted tax exemptions: Delaware in 1796,
Connecticut in 1808, and, at the beginning of the nineteenth
century, both New York and Virginia passed religious taxexemption statutes at the time that they repealed statutes that
established churches.138 Importantly, the Virginia statute was
passed when James Madison was a member of the General
Assembly.139 This action by Virginians carries great weight because
Virginia led the fight to eliminate church-state interdependence.
But even as time went on, this viewpoint was a mainstay in
debates over church tax exemption. For example, at the 1891
Kentucky state constitutional convention it was argued that

135. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S 664, 673 (1970) (“Grants of exemption historically
reflect the concern of authors of constitutions and statutes as to the latent dangers inherent
in the imposition of property taxes; exemption constitutes a reasonable and balanced attempt
to guard against those dangers.”).
136. Mark W. Cordes, Politics, Religion, and the First Amendment, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 111,
130 (2000).
137. King, supra note 37, at 975–76.
138. Id. at 978–79; see also Reka Potgieter Hoff, The Financial Accountability of Churches
for Federal Income Tax Purposes: Establishment or Free Exercise?, 11 VA. TAX REV. 71, 109 (1991);
Zollmann, supra note 78, at 648 (“The practice of exempting [church property] was
universally considered to be proper . . . .”). See generally CHESTER JAMES ANTIEAU, PHILLIP
MARK CARROLL & THOMAS CARROLL BURKE, RELIGION UNDER THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS
123–24 (1965) (discussing state constitutional clauses providing for tax exemption to
churches and church-related institutions).
139. Walz, 397 U.S. at 684 (Brennan, J., concurring); Appellee’s Brief, Walz, 397 U.S. 664
(1969) (No. 135), 1969 WL 119910 at *7.
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separation of church and state precluded taxing churches.140
Similarly, at the 1850 Indiana Convention for the Revision of the
State Constitution it was argued that church taxation violated
religious autonomy principles.141
Federal practice tracked that of the states. The practice of
exempting churches from taxation began in 1802 during the
presidency of Thomas Jefferson, when Congress exempted
churches within the County of Alexandria from property taxation,
patterned after the Virginia statutory pattern.142 Several years later
in 1813, at a time when most government revenue was collected by
customs duties, Congress exempted from taxation duties paid by
religious societies on religious articles.143 Two years later, a
Congressional tax on household furniture was enacted, but it
exempted the property of religious organizations.144 During the
same period, the District of Columbia exempted church property
from real and personal property tax assessments.145
Exemption of churches from property and custom taxes
continued from that time until today. The first federal income tax,
passed in 1863, exempted religious organizations.146 In 1864, a tax
on lottery receipts exempted religious organizations.147 And an
additional property tax, passed in 1870 in the District of Columbia,
continued the practice of exempting churches.148
The Revenue Act of 1894, which was later found
unconstitutional for different reasons, exempted religious

140. Paul J. Weber & Janet R. Olson, Religious Property Tax Exemptions in Kentucky, 66
KY. L.J. 651, 655 (1978) (“Representative Thomas Pettit of Daviess County contended that the
principle of separation of church and state precludes taxing the church.”).
141. 2 REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE
REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1290 (1850) (“I consider our civil
and religious liberty and prosperity, is so inseparably connected to each other . . . for these
reasons, and others that might be named, I hope the [church taxation] proposition may be
voted down.”); id. at 1289 (“Now suppose the taxes are not paid; are you going to sell these
churches? Will you put them up at auction to the highest bidder, in order to raise the amount
levied in the way of tax? Certainly not.”).
142. Walz, 397 U.S. at 677.
143. Whitehead, supra note 65, at 541.
144. Id.
145. Walz, 397 U.S. at 677.
146. Whitehead, supra note 65, at 541.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 541–42.
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organizations from taxation.149 After the Sixteenth Amendment
was passed in 1913, the Revenue Act of 1913 exempted religious
organizations from taxation.150 This exemption is the same that
exists today. Also existing to this day are state income and property
exemptions for religious organizations in all fifty states.151
The justification for religious organizations’ constitutional right
to tax exemption comes from historical practice that sought to end
the struggle for supremacy between the church and the state.152
III. THE JOHNSON AMENDMENT AND BOB JONES PUBLIC POLICY
STANDARD UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
TAX EXEMPTION
Since tax exemption of churches is a constitutional right secured
by the First Amendment, not only are religious organizations
exempt from taxation, but also two specific areas of the current taxexempt regime are called into question: the Johnson Amendment
and the Bob Jones public policy standard. The Johnson Amendment
conditions tax-exempt status upon religious organizations
refraining from endorsing or opposing a political candidate. And
the Bob Jones public policy standard allows revocation of taxexempt status for operations in conflict with existing public policy.
Regarding the Johnson Amendment, it is state interference in
church government, faith, and doctrine. As such, the state cannot
revoke exemption for the mere expression of support for or
opposition to a candidate, it can only revoke exemption for
religious organizations’ other actions in support of or in opposition
to a candidate. As for the Bob Jones public policy standard, its use
should be limited to ending racial discrimination.
A. The Johnson Amendment
The Johnson Amendment revokes tax-exempt status when a
religious organization endorses or opposes a candidate running for

149. Id. at 542.
150. Id.
151. 4 WILLIAM W. BASSETT, W. COLE DURHAM, JR., ROBERT T. SMITH & MARK
GOLDFEDER, RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW §§ 33:8, 33:50 (2020).
152. This Note does not deny that religious organizations’ public benefits are also a
historic rationale for tax exemption.
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public office.153 Before the Johnson Amendment, the 1934 Congress
enacted a law that revokes the tax-exempt status of religious
organizations substantially involved in influencing legislation.154
In 1954, the prohibition against endorsing or opposing candidates
was added.155
The most high-profile use of the Johnson Amendment occurred
in 1998,156 when the IRS revoked Branch Ministries’ exempt status
after the organization took out full-page newspaper advertisements
in USA Today and the Washington Times opposing the candidacy
of Bill Clinton.157 Each advertisement contained the following
statement: “This advertisement was co-sponsored by the Church at
Pierce Creek, Daniel J. Little, Senior Pastor, and by churches and
concerned Christians nationwide. Tax-deductible donations for
this advertisement gladly accepted.”158 The advertisements
resulted in numerous country-wide contributions to the church.159
The United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit
upheld the IRS’s exemption revocation because it was not a
substantial burden on Branch Ministries’ free exercise.160
Proceeding on the assumption that tax exemption is a “conditional
privilege” granted by the government, the court found no First
Amendment issue with the requirement that Branch give up its
participation in political activities to secure exemption, because a
withdrawal from electoral politics did not violate its beliefs.161 All
that was required was for the church to “renounce[] future
involvement in political campaigns.”162
Instead of the Rossotti court assuming that tax exemption is a
conditional privilege under the Free Exercise Clause, it should have
153. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
154. Roger Colinvaux, The Political Speech of Charities in the Face of Citizens United: A
Defense of Prohibition, 62 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 685, 693 (2012).
155. Id.
156. Mark A. Goldfeder & Michelle K. Terry, To Repeal or Not Repeal: The Johnson
Amendment, 48 U. MEM. L. REV. 209, 227 (2017). There has not been a revocation since, even
though there have been clear violations of the Johnson Amendment. Id. at 231. This is likely
because the rules around enforcement are so ambiguous, politically fraught, and
burdensome that enforcement is avoided. See id. at 224–27, 231.
157. Branch Ministries v. Rossotti, 211 F.3d 137, 140 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 144.
161. Id. at 142.
162. Id. at 143.

1029

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

47:3 (2022)

taken the approach found in the Supreme Court’s religious
autonomy jurisprudence. In these cases, the Court held that
religious organizations are “independ[ent] from secular control or
manipulation,” and therefore have the “power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine.”163 Thus, the
proper analysis is whether the government is interfering in matters
of church government, faith, and doctrine by instituting an outright
ban on religious organizations endorsing or opposing a candidate
for public office. That question is answered in the affirmative: a
religious organization’s decision to endorse or oppose a candidate
for public office is a matter of church government, faith, and
doctrine.164 As such, it should be free from state interference.
Although the state should not interfere with the decision, the
state has an interest in not subsidizing political speech.165 To protect
these interests without also violating religious autonomy, the state
can limit the extent of religious organizations’ actions in support of
or in opposition to a candidate’s campaign.166 Rossotti gives a
proper illustration of this power: the IRS revoked a church’s tax
exemption after the church advertised its views on a candidate in
newspapers and requested political donations. Thus, even under an
autonomy argument in Rossotti, Branch Ministries would have lost
its exempt status.
Nonetheless, the government’s ability to limit religious
organizations’ involvement with and actions for or against a
political candidate cannot outright prohibit the mere expression of
and explanation for support or opposition to a candidate for public
163. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am.,
344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952).
164. Government regulation of a religious organization’s position on a candidate
involves government interference with internal church doctrine, subjecting it to the
constraints of the autonomy doctrine, whereas the Free Exercise jurisprudence used in
Rossotti applies only to government regulation of outward physical acts. See supra
Section II.A.1.
165. See Regan v. Tax’n with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983)
(“Congress has not violated . . . First Amendment rights by declining to subsidize . . .
[lobbying] activities.”); Ellen P. Aprill, Amending the Johnson Amendment in the Age of Cheap
Speech, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 1, 9–10 (2018) (“[N]o duty to subsidize doctrine.”); cf.
Colinvaux, supra note 154, at 704 (“[T]he Rule is one of the few bright-lines that places a
meaningful limit on the charitable purpose requirement and so constrains the scope of the
charitable tax benefits.”).
166. See Regan, 461 U.S. at 548.
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office. This approach provides safety for churches who merely
state and explain their beliefs on particular candidates without
taking other actions in support or opposition to a candidate for
public office.167
In sum, this approach would narrow the Johnson Amendment
so that religious organizations can be independent from state
interference, control, or manipulation on this matter of church
government, faith, and doctrine. At the same time, the state can
prevent political speech subsidization.
Moreover, this approach treats religious organizations similar
to how they were treated before 1934.168 Numerous religious
organizations in this nation’s history devoted efforts to enact
societal change through legislation and elections. One example is
Virginia Baptists who, under John Leland, endorsed James
Madison’s campaign for the Virginia Ratifying Convention and
U.S. House of Representatives—a crucial factor in passing the First
Amendment—and Thomas Jefferson’s campaign for President.169
But religious support for societal movements goes back even
earlier: minsters’ sermons were a dominant force behind the very
revolution that established the Union.170 And, although the Union
was tainted by the “original sin” of slavery, it was religious
organizations that called for its abolition.171 Their efforts created the

167. However, there is no certainty that free of the Johnson Amendment, churches
would become involved in politics. See Colinvaux, supra note 154, at 705–06 (“To the extent
that the consumers of charity do not want charities to become involved in politics, many, if
not most, charities will respond to this sentiment and remain aloof. It is easy to imagine a
charity, dipping a toe in the political water to endorse a candidate for the first time, only to
hear from angry donors and others that the activity was inappropriate. A charity’s
stakeholders might also accuse the charity of endorsing the wrong candidate, or argue that
the charity should not even risk endorsing a losing candidate, for fear of jeopardizing the
charity’s standing in the community as an opponent of an elected official.”).
168. Goldfeder & Terry, supra note 156, at 211–12; Cordes, supra note 136, at 112–13, 129
(“[T]here is little reason to believe that the religion clauses were intended to exclude religion
from the public square. Rather, the history leading up to and surrounding the adoption of
the First Amendment suggests that the religion clauses were ratified in order to avoid
compelled religious worship and financial support for churches.”); Mark S. Scarberry, John
Leland and James Madison: Religious Influence on the Ratification of the Constitution and on the
Proposal of the Bill of Rights, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 733 (2009).
169. See Scarberry, supra note 168, at 789.
170. Cordes, supra note 136, at 123–24.
171. David F. Forte, Spiritual Equality: The Black Codes and the Americanization of the
Freedmen, LOY. L. REV. 569, 578 (1998) (“Radical abolitionism began and remained until the
end of the Civil War, a movement born of, connected to, and sustained by religious principles
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idea of the equality of the races, which was later enshrined in law
through the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and early
civil rights legislation.172 The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the most
momentous legislation regarding equality in America, was brought
about through the steady efforts of black churches.173 Besides race
relations, religious organizations also drove the nation towards
equal rights for women.174
These examples point out that there are issues in society that
religious organizations should not keep silent on. Their conscience
instructs them to speak out on certain issues, legislation, and
candidates.175 With the perspective of religious organizations, the
Union was founded on strong principles and continually worked
toward a more perfect Union.
One further point is that there is no contradiction in prohibiting
churches from lobbying for tax incentives176 while still permitting
and fervor. Whatever notion of equality between the races that may have entered the legal
debate was distinctly religiously founded.”).
172. Id. at 610 (“It was a theological doctrine from which we derived our notion of
equality in the Reconstruction Amendments.”).
173. ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE 4 (1984) (“The black church functioned as the
institutional center of the modern civil rights movement. Churches provided the movement
with an organized mass base; a leadership of clergymen largely economically independent
of the larger white society and skilled in the art of managing people and resources; an
institutionalized financial base through which protest was financed; and meeting places
where the masses planned tactics and strategies and collectively committed themselves to
the struggle.”).
174. MARK A. NOLL, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA
180–85 (1992) (“[R]evivals encouraged women to play a more active part not only in
narrowly spiritual matters but also in the larger arenas of social reform. Often in the context
of revival women stove mightily against slavery (Sarah and Angelina Grimké), for better
treatment of the mentally ill (Dorothea Dix), for educational opportunities for women
(Catherine Beecher), and later in the temperance crusade (Fances Willard) and social work
in the cities (Jane Adams). . . . The first formal call for fuller women’s rights in society,
including the right to vote, was issued from Seneca Falls, New York, in July 1848, when active
abolitionists, men and women, white and black, issued an appeal for the public rights of
women.”). Id. at 183–84.
175. “Open thy mouth for the dumb in the cause of all such as are appointed to
destruction. Open thy mouth, judge righteously, and plead the cause of the poor and needy.”
Proverbs 31: 8–9 (King James); “But if the watchman see the sword come, and blow not the
trumpet, and the people be not warned; if the sword come, and take any person from among
them, he is taken away in his iniquity; but his blood will I require at the watchman’s hand.”
Ezekiel 33:6 (King James); “Therefore to him that knoweth to do good, and doeth it not, to
him it is sin.” James 4:17 (King James). Although, of course, not all religious organizations
interpret their sacred texts as requiring this kind of engagement.
176. See supra Section II.B.
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churches to state their beliefs on important political issues. This
Note advocates against the taxation of churches, in part, because
taxation requires more representation, giving churches the right to
direct government policy and resources. Or, in other words, the
right to use religion as an engine of civil policy. With exemption,
on the other hand, religious organizations’ mere expression of its
view has no authority over the state.
B. The Bob Jones Public Policy Standard
In Bob Jones University v. United States, the Supreme Court
considered the actions of the IRS in revoking the tax-exempt status
of two religious colleges who, due to their religious beliefs, had
racially discriminatory admissions policies.177 The Court held that
the United States’ tax-exemption code was rooted in English
treatment of charitable trusts, and, as such, organizations receiving
exemptions must serve a public purpose and not act contrary to
established public policy.178 Nevertheless, the revocation of
charitable status can only be done “where there can be no doubt
that the activity involved is contrary to a fundamental public
policy.”179 While recognizing that removing the schools’ taxexempt status was a burden on religious freedom, the Court
recognized that the government’s interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education was substantially overriding because
“[f]ew social or political issues in our history have been more
vigorously debated and more extensively ventilated than the issue
of racial discrimination,” and long-standing, unequivocal policies
from the all three branches of the federal government forbade
the practice.180
In approving the revocation, the Bob Jones Court correctly
recognized taxation’s burden on religious liberty. And, in general,
the Supreme Court recognizes that exerting power over religious
education offends religious autonomy.181 With these important
177. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 575 (1983).
178. Id. at 588.
179. Id. at 592.
180. Id. at 603–04.
181. See Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2064–66 (2020)
(stating there is a “close connection that religious institutions draw between their central
purpose and educating the young in the faith,” and “[r]eligious education is vital to many
faiths practiced in the United States”); id. at 2060 (“[T]he Religion Clauses protect the right
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rights at stake, a religious school’s exempt status should indeed
only be revoked in limited circumstances with compelling
government interests. Ending racial discrimination in education is
one of those circumstances because of this nation’s history of
slavery, racism, and discrimination and its unanimous and
unequivocal policies against it. Truly, there is no comparison to
race-based discrimination in this country.182 Additionally, the
Court has given religious-based racial bias little credibility.183
On the other hand, when the Court has addressed other forms
of discrimination intersecting with religious belief, religious beliefs
have been protected. While that is far from condoning
discrimination, the Court has recognized—in a way different from
its racial discrimination cases—the important religious interests at
stake. For instance, the Court has refused to expand discrimination
laws to govern ministers184 and recognized that sincere faith-based
opposition to same-sex marriage is protected.185
of churches and other religious institutions to decide matters of faith and doctrine without
government intrusion.”) (quotations omitted); Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
& Sch. v. Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n, 565 U.S. 171, 189 (2012) (“[T]he First
Amendment . . . gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations.”); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (“[T]he First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State
from compelling [Amish parents] to cause their children to attend formal high school to age
[sixteen].”).
182. Johnny Rex Buckles, The Sexual Integrity of Religious Schools and Tax Exemption, 40
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 255, 311–12 (2017) (“The history of race-based slavery in this country,
and the pattern of systematic racial discrimination that followed formal emancipation
systematically and with official sanction in public institutions, including schools, have no
true parallel.”).
183. See, e.g., Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 575.
184. See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 196 (“The interest of society in the enforcement of
employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of
religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out
their mission.”); Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch., 140 S. Ct. at 2069.
185. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 141 S. Ct. 1868, 1882 (2021) (“The refusal of
Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care services unless it agrees to
certify same-sex couples as foster parents cannot survive strict scrutiny, and violates the First
Amendment.”); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 672 (2015) (“Many who deem same-sex
marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or
philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here.”); id. at 679–
80 (“[I]t must be emphasized that religions, and those who adhere to religious doctrines, may
continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that, by divine precepts, same-sex
marriage should not be condoned. The First Amendment ensures that religious
organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles
that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths, and to their own deep aspirations
to continue the family structure they have long revered.”); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v.
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This different treatment of other forms of discrimination makes
Bob Jones inapposite beyond racial discrimination. For example,
consider Bob Jones’s application to religious colleges’ enforcement
of standards governing sexual conduct. As opposed to racial
discrimination, the Court has protected similar beliefs. Nor are
there long-standing government policies from all three branches of
government forbidding religious schools’ attempts to regulate
sexual conduct on campus.186 Therefore, Bob Jones does not apply to
this scenario.187
Furthermore, the Bob Jones Court’s recognition that the
United States’ practice of tax exemption has underpinnings in
English charitable trust law is more reason to limit the use of
public policy standards against religious organizations. For a
considerable portion of its existence, England’s charitable use law
was used as a tool of religious persecution.188 Courts frequently
discriminated against non-established churches by voiding gifts
given to non-established religions and diverting them to the
established church.189 And trusts benefiting non-established
Colo. C.R. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1727 (2018) (“[R]eligious and philosophical objections to
gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression.”).
Other First Amendment rights received the same protections; see, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v.
Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 640 (2000) (“[A]pplying New Jersey’s public accommodations law [to
require admission of homosexual individuals] violates the Boy Scouts’ First Amendment
right of expressive association.”).
186. Kif Augustine-Adams, Religious Exemptions to Title IX, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 327, 327
(2016) (“Forty years into the Title IX game, the score is 285 to 0, religious exemptions
recognized versus those denied”); Buckles, supra note 182, at 308 (“If the fundament factors
are analyzed in the case of religious schools maintaining sexual conduct policies in the same
manner that the factors were analyzed in Bob Jones, religious schools remain exempt from
tax. The United States lacks long-standing, consistent policies announced by the highest
institutions and offices of the three branches of the federal government that attempt to stamp
out efforts by schools to discourage pre-marital sex or to promote traditional marriage.”).
187. Herman D. Hofman, For Richer or for Poorer: How Obergefell v. Hodges Affects the
Tax-Exempt Status of Religious Organizations That Oppose Same-Sex Marriage, 52 GONZ. L. REV.
21, 56 (2017).
188. A Revaluation of Cy Pres, 49 YALE L.J. 303, 304–06 (1939); see also Attorney-General
v. Baxter, 1 Vern 248 (1684) (striking down a trust of non-conformist clergymen and diverting
its use to the established church because its non-conformist use was superstitious); De Costa
v. Da Paz, 1 Dick 259 (1754) (striking a bequest and diverting the funds to a hospital because
its use for Jewish religion was superstitious); Carry v. Abbott, 7 Ves Jun 491 (1802) (voiding
a disposition for Roman Catholic education because its use was superstitious). See generally
Matthew Harding, Trusts for Religious Purposes and the Question of Public Benefit, 71 MODERN
L. REV. 159, 161–62 (2008) (describing several seventeenth-century English cases where trusts
were struck down for public policy reasons).
189. A Revaluation of Cy Pres, supra note 188.
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churches were declared illegal because their use was
“superstitious.”190 Herein lies the importance of limiting publicpolicy revocation of exempt status so that it does not become a tool
to establish or punish religions.
Taken together, revocation of tax exemption should be limited
to racial discrimination in education to avoid violating the First
Amendment and abusing the public policy tool.
CONCLUSION
Religious organizations’ tax-exempt status is a constitutional
right rooted in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. The
principles at the core of the Religion Clauses—as declared by James
Madison in his Memorial and Remonstrance and supported by case
law, statutory law, and historical practice—forbid federal, state,
and local governments from levying income and property tax
against religious organizations’ non-commercial income and
property. This avoids intermingling of church and state,
threatening free exercise, disadvantaging poor religions, tarnishing
America’s image as a land of religious liberty, and increasing
disruptions and divisions in society. Recognition of this
constitutional right avoids taxation, but it also calls for adjustments
to some current tax-exempt law, specifically, narrowing the
Johnson Amendment and the Bob Jones public policy standard.
Further questions remain and will need to be addressed in this
complicated and sensitive area. For instance, the definition and
breadth of religious, non-commercial income and property need
further clarification. This further clarification may expand or shrink
the current tax benefits religious organizations receive, but the
constitutional right to tax exemption dismisses once and for all
the threat to tax the non-commercial property and income of
religious groups.

190. Id. at 305.
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